





Potential Social Benefits of Catalonian Independence:  
Immigrants and their Integration 
 
 
Within an increasingly globalized society, immigrants can migrate greater distances. As 
immigrants travel greater distances, the country or region becomes less homogenous. The ease of 
transports leads to immigrants traveling, not just within a continent, but throughout the entire 
world. Catalonia is a region in the broader context of Spain with a large population of 
immigrants adding to the cultural diversity of their region. With the knowledge of Catalonia’s 
increasing diversity, Catalonia must proactively find ways to incorporate the immigrant 
population into their society. Integration begins with legislation and political stances on the 
commitment to inclusion and diversity in the region.  
However, legislation affecting immigrants and actual social integration of these 
immigrant communities are not equivalent. In Catalonian society, the discrepancy between 
positive political policy on immigration and negative social implementation exposes an alarming 
disconnect. So why is there this disconnect? I argue that part of the issue with immigrants’ social 
integration stems from the dual identity of Catalonia, being both Spanish and Catalan. This dual 
identity adds a layer of complexity for immigrants to understand. The challenges of Catalonia 
being a stateless nation within a nation-state causes the discrepancy between politically 
progressive policies and socially regressive treatment of immigrants. Therefore, taking away a 
social obstacle for immigrants and opening up the path to unhindered integration can be achieved 
through independence. First, I will assess the current state of the migrant within Catalonia, 
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demonstrating that a simpler social atmosphere will assist in integration. Then I will display the 
plausibility of independence for the Catalonian nation, showing that the remedy for a complex 
Catalonian cultural identity is possible.  
Two Migrant Communities: Spanish Nationals and Immigrants 
 Catalonia experienced three waves of immigration along with the Spanish state: “1900-
1940 period, 1940-1970 period, and the 2000-2010 period” (Climent-Ferrando 2012, 4-5; Pujolar 
1995). The first two waves of migrants were largely lower class Spanish citizens from other 
Spanish regions (Climent-Ferrando 2012). The 2000-2010 period marked a distinct increase in 
foreign immigration, with 15% of all Catalonian citizens now being from other regions outside 
Spain (Climent-Ferrando 2012, Statistical Institute of Catalonia 2009). With this sharp influx in 
immigration, both Catalonia and Spain must sort out the best methods to integrate foreigners, 
along with who bears responsibility to administer this integration. It is important to flesh out the 
demographics of the foreign immigrant population before addressing the social sphere of 
immigration. The Spanish migrant community, in contrast to foreign immigrants, faces a lower 
degree of adaptation and social concerns within the large context of Catalonia as Catalonia is still 
a part of the Spanish nation. Indeed, Serra points out that “very few [migrants] of Spanish origin 
and their descendants view themselves as [other] or consider their integration into Catalan 
society to be in any way comparable to that of the new immigrants” (2004, 435). Therefore, the 
group that faces discrimination and social isolation, the foreign immigrants, needs further 
exploration.  
Figure 1 (below) shows the breakdown of each foreign nationality entering Catalonia and 
the percentage of the total foreign population the nationality represents. Moroccans make up 
almost 20% of the total immigrant population. This large percentage most likely stems from 
 
Bastie 3 
Morocco's relative proximity to Spain. It is important to note that according to the CIA World 
Factbook, 99% of Moroccans are Islamic (The World Factbook N.D.). As the immigrants enter a 
traditionally Catholic European state, this religious distinction carries high importance. 
Discrimination based on their religious background, namely the anti-mosque campaigns, affects 
the experience and integration of these groups (Astor 2016).  
Romanians are the next largest group entering Catalonia, making up 8% of all 
immigrants. Romanians adhere to Romanian Orthodoxy. Romanian immigrants face a degree of 
discrimination through seemingly benevolent Catalonian integration policies, as laid out by Ioana 
Vrabiescu and to be discussed in depth later (2017). The difference in religion and culture for 
both the Moroccan and the Romanian immigrants highlights a gap that causes a variety of social 
obstacles for immigrants in their attempt to integrate into Catalonian society.  




It is important to note how rapid the influx of immigrants was; Catalonia had to quickly 
accommodate this wave. (Climent-Ferrando 2012). Between 2003 and 2007, “the number of 
counties with [a foreign population of more than 10%] went from eight to thirty-five” (Statistical 
Institute of Catalonia 2009). Climent-Ferrando attributes this escalation in immigration to “major 
economic growth which [attracts] predominantly young, unskilled migrants” for labor needs “not 
met by the local population” (2012, Pujolar 1995). A visual aid can illustrate the significance of 
the increase in immigration experienced between these four years. Figure 2 (below) shows the 
proportion of the foreign population by county in Catalonia through two choropleth maps. The 
two maps illustrate the challenges for a society that needs to integrate these individuals  into the 
community. As shown in Figure 2, Catalonia faced a massive wave of immigration, not in an 
isolated location, but throughout the entire region. 
Figure 2 (Statistical Institute of Catalonia (2009) Immigration Here and Now.)
 
One of the main concerns with a growing immigrant community is their social well-
being. Since the fall of Franco’s regime in 1975, both Spain and Catalonia have passed measures 
to ensure the inclusion of immigrants in the broader context of Spanish and Catalonian society. 
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An example of a policy that aims to include immigrants is the Plan for Citizenship and 
Immigration 2005-2008 (Regional), which stresses the integration of immigrants into Catalonian 
culture (Villarroya 2012). Spain is a political federation, meaning that Catalonia can legislate on 
matters specific to their region as long as it does not violate national law. Laws will be 
referenced as “national” or “regional,” in order to distinguish the origin of the legislation. 
Managing immigrant policy between nation and region proves difficult, especially when 
Catalonia requires a distinct integration plan based on the region’s specific needs (Climent-
Ferrando 2012). These policies, though well intentioned, still do not close the gap of inequality 
between the two migrant groups. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the disparity between Spanish 
nationals and foreign immigrants. Figure 3 shows the unemployment rate for both communities. 
This unemployment rate is much higher for foreigners , totaling about 30% higher for men and 
20% higher for women. Figure 4 displays both average annual income and poverty rates. On 
average, international immigrants make about 7,000 euros less than Spanish migrants and are 
about 20% more likely to live in poverty.  
Figure 3 (Statistical Institute of Catalonia (2009) Immigration Here and Now.)




Figure 4 (Statistical Institute of Catalonia (2009) Immigration Here and Now.) 
 
With the social predicament of immigrants rapidly changing since the mid-2000s, an 
independent Catalonia now has a large population of immigrants (15%) who do not speak 
Catalan and face various social disadvantages when attempting to integrate. Therefore, migrants 
from Spain and immigrants from other countries face vastly different obstacles when trying to 
become a part of Catalonian society. 
Social Barriers Foreign Immigrants Face 
Fierce nationalistic sentiment courses through Catalonia. The strength of this political 
sentiment for autonomy might lead a bystander to think Catalonia’s strong national identity 
inherently excludes the immigrant population (Rodon and Franco-Guillen 2014). However, 
Catalonian nationalist discourse expresses positivity towards immigrants and a desire to include 
them in their society (Rodon and Franco-Guillen 2014, Astor 2016, Pujolar 2010). The 
comprehensive effort of inclusivity appears explicitly in the “Plan for language and social 
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cohesion” which Catalonia renewed in 2007. Some of the critical elements, listed below, 
demonstrate Catalonia’s progressive approach toward immigration (Pujolar 2010).  
(1) integration is given priority over language learning, as it is integration that facilitates 
language learning and not the other way around; (2) the teaching of the language does not 
primarily seek to protect Catalan identity but to promote social cohesion in a plurilingual 
society; (3) the learning of the language cannot be promoted in isolation from the general 
social conditions and relationships in which students live, which means that it involves 
families, the teachers of all disciplines and other local actors; (4) the learning of the 
language (or the languages) is not a precondition for participation in the school system; 
but a process taking place throughout the student’s academic life, and finally (5) 
intercultural education does not apply only to schools with significant numbers of foreign 
students, but becomes a constructive feature of the system and a key element in the 
curriculum (Pujolar 2010, 233-34). 
 
This plan demonstrates the commitment to provide an inclusive society for the foreign immigrant 
population. The Catalonian government recognizes the social disadvantages of foreign 
immigrants and attempts to combat these problems through additional policies such as free 
education and healthcare (Dowsett 2017). But the implementation of these inclusive policies 
proves problematic. The Catalonian case proves particularly complicated. Despite the effort by 
the government to include immigrants through the public school system, adult immigrant aid, 
and basic societal courtesies and norms, social woes of foreign immigrants in Catalonian society 
persist. One aspect that hinders immigrant integration is the complex social situation of 
Catalonia, being both Spanish and Catalan. This duality is one of the reasons positive political 
policy fails in its implementation, which ostracizes the immigrant population.  
Educational System: 
 As mentioned before, immigrants receive free education regardless of their legal status. 
This provision intends to integrate immigrants from a young age into the Catalonian school 
system so that they might learn Catalan and other societal norms (Edwards 2016). Catalonia’s 
leading tactic for integration is “language acquisition” through “education” (Rodon and Franco-
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Guillen 2014). The Catalonia language acts not only as a tool through which immigrants 
integrate into society, but also as a mechanism to achieve socio-economic mobility (Hoffman 
1999, Pujolar 1995). Therefore, immigrants see language as a means to further their social status, 
both for themselves and for generations to come.  
However, a young student of foreign descent experiences high levels of “racist violence” 
in the public school system (Serra 2004, 433). To understand the complexities of Catalonia’s 
educational system, this analysis of two studies will explore the vastly different results within 
Catalonia. Carles Serra’s study contrasts with Catrin Edward’s research and provides an 
interesting dichotomy of the Catalonian schools and how these regional policies work at the local 
level (Serra 2004, Edwards 2016). Through teasing out the social integration of immigrants in 
two cities, it is revealed that the determining factor of immigrant integration is the number of 
Spanish nationals within the region.  
Serra studied the social groups formed in Guillem d'Efak school in El Villar (2004). Serra 
uncovers deep-seated racist ideology in the students, both Spanish and Catalonian nationals, that 
points to the poor integration of cultural minorities in contrast to the political push for 
inclusivity. Although there are “palpable tensions among” these students around the Catalan-
Spanish divide, it lacks racial animosity (Serra 2004, 439). These migrants speak a different, yet 
familiar, language, explaining the position that Spanish migrants have over foreign immigrants. 
Additionally, the Spanish migrants complicate the situation for foreign immigrants. The Spanish 
students and their parents, in some regions, request for classes to be taught in Spanish rather than 
Catalan. In reaction to these requests, the Supreme Court of Spain ruled that 25% of all classes in 
Catalonia can be taught in Spanish (Catalan News 2015). This new rule complicates the 
integration of immigrants who participate in schools where Spanish students demand access to 
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classes in Spanish. With the confusion and mingling of the two languages in the school system, 
immigrants’ integration suffers at the hands of this dual identity.  
Not only do immigrants enter a socially complex school system, the Spanish and 
Catalonian students saw immigrants as outsiders and isolated them based on their racial identity 
(Pujolar 2010, Serra 2004). Serra exposed students’ tendencies to generalize, stereotype, and 
isolate the immigrant population, and the rhetoric of these students verifies these tendencies 
(Serra 2004). One student went as far to justify her rationale for not associating with immigrants 
by merely stating that “they don’t interest [her]” (Serra 2004, 443). The general disinterest in and 
violent treatment of the foreign immigrant demonstrates that the political advocacy for 
multiculturalism and inclusivity does not reach social implementation. Even teachers perpetuate 
the problem of social isolation by separating students by nationality for different classroom 
activities (Serra 2004).  
The dissemination of inclusive policies might take time, and Edwards showed the already 
improving integration of immigrants into the Catalonian school system. Edwards studied the city 
of Vic, a center-right leaning region where a large immigrant community lives (2016). One 
difference between Edwards and Serra’s study is the period in which they were conducted. Serra 
studied the racist patterns of Catalonian and Spanish school children towards immigrants in 
2004, while Edwards focused on the integration of immigrant school children in 2016. Within 
the twelve year gap, Catalonia’s policy to include immigrant populations improved. The city of 
Vic recognized that the segregation of immigrant school children based on their neighborhood 
acts as another barrier to the integration of these children and their families into Catalonian 
society (Edwards 2016). Therefore, Vic coupled model and ajuntament policies to first create a 
quota of immigrants per school, and then increase the quota when the immigrant community 
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continued to grow (Edwards 2016). For the benefit of the immigrants, the local government 
created "language classes" in the community center. “Theatre workshops" and "cultural 
workshops based on Catalan tradition,” which include both locals and new immigrants, provide a 
safe learning environment for integration (Edwards 2016, 537-38). All of these showed that 
regional policy adopted and expanded at the local level aided in social integration for 
immigrants. However, the cities studied adds nuance to their comparison. Vic, while center-right, 
is also nationalistic and is considered the “traditional Catalan city” (Edwards 2016, 531). El 
Villar, the site of Serra’s study, has a pluralistic identity containing both Spanish and Catalonian 
nationals, in addition to the foreign immigrants. While the findings of Edwards prove promising 
for the future integration policies in Catalonia, the differentiating factor, the number of Spanish 
nationals, distinguishes the two cities, and therefore, the two studies. Because of Vic’s less 
socially complex profile, the immigrants found integration easier. 
Social Services: 
 Social services are the direct application of governmental policies to aid the immigrant 
community, as well as others. Politicians directly legislate these programs in response to “newly 
arrived immigrants” who “lack an understanding of the legal culture and social norms of the host 
society and its institutional system and protocols” (Agustí-Panareda 2006, 410). While 
immigrant children have the opportunity during their formative years to matriculate in school 
(Edwards 2016, Serra 2004, Pujolar 1995), the education of adult immigrants poses a different 
set of problems regarding social integration. The Catalonian government created several 
programs, like the intercultural mediators (Community Mediation Service of the Province of 
Barcelona - Regional Policy created within the National Policy), to help mitigate the complex 
Catalonian society (Vrabiescu 2017, Agustí-Panareda 2006, Pujolar 2010). Despite good 
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intentions, this policy proves problematic in the face of immigrant needs because of the 
disconnect between legislation and legislative reality. (Vrabiescu 2017 and Agustí-Panareda 
2006). Mediators inevitably interject themselves into the immigrant’s situation, often 
overstepping the bounds of the job (Vrabiescu 2017) and taking critical social decisions into their 
own hands (Agustí-Panareda 2006). By stripping the immigrants of choices, such as which 
language to learn first or how to best raise their children, the policy renders the immigrants’ 
native culture obsolete in the face of assimilation. Catalonia must reconcile the difference 
between assimilation and cultural pluralism. These tactics point back to the dual-culture of 
Catalonia, and the clash between Catalonian and Spanish identities as Catalonian civil servants 
attempt to help immigrants integrate into this complex society. 
In the case of Romanian immigrants, Catalonian officials “under the guise of institutional 
benevolence” break apart families (Vrabiescu 2017, 1664). As mentioned before, Romanian 
immigrants make up the second largest immigrant population. These families take on low paying 
jobs and maintain a low socioeconomic status as they begin the integration process (Climent-
Ferrando 2012, Vrabiescu 2017). For this reason, Catalonia provides institutional aid (National 
Policy) in the form of “civil servants and social workers” who “activate the child protection 
mechanism to ensure the immobility” of Romanian families (Vrabiescu 2017, 1664). These 
lower-level governmental workers often subjectively seize mistreated Romanian children. This 
process appears logical. The Catalonian government employs people to check on immigrant 
families to ensure their children receive proper treatment. But the cultural difference between the 
Catalonian and Romanian immigrants causes issues that can be viewed subjectively as the 
government seizes children by parental “lack [of] legal documents, residential status, or . . . 
[registration status] in the educational or health system” (Vrabiescu 2017, 1671). These reasons 
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cause unnecessary checks on the immigrant community and destabilize the Romanian familial 
structure.  
The shortcomings of Romanian immigrant integration show a level of institutional 
insensitivity and misunderstanding that ruptures Romanian families. The Catalonian government 
will have to work to assuage the social missteps with the Romanian community while the 
Romanian community must embrace interculturality. Vrabiescu mistakenly associates the term 
assimilation with the Catalonian government's mission to have a culturally pluralistic society. 
The Vrabiescu’s implication that the Catalonian government expects full-scale assimilation from 
the immigrant community exaggerates the Catalonian government’s treatment of the immigrants. 
The Catalonian government wishes to respect immigrants’ culture and to aid them with 
integration into society. Assimilation, as Vrabiescu describes it, implies that the government 
expects the immigrants to forsake their culture and fully assimilate with the culture of Catalonia. 
While some integration is required to make a cohesive society, the government makes their 
intentions clear as to the extent to which they expect integration. Therefore, the disconnect 
occurs at a lower-level implementation of policy.  
The civil servants have unusually high expectations for Romanian immigrants exposing a 
significant flaw in the integration process. These high expectations could range from thinking the 
immigrant should assimilate faster or that the immigrant’s practices contrast too greatly with the 
other Catalonian government policy. With either of these in mind, the governmental employee 
inspecting the family could have a warped view of what their integration process should look 
like, subverting Catalonian policy. However, the Catalonian government “has taken a leading 
role in supporting initiatives that promote the rights of religious minorities, homosexuals, 
undocumented immigrants, and other groups that have faced discrimination” (Astor 2016, 97-8). 
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Even though the Romanian case of social service shows the discrepancy between political policy 
and social implementation, the Catalonian people still maintain positive intentions regarding 
immigrants, as evidenced by legislative action.  
The civil servants interacting with the Romanian immigrant community are not the only 
group who subvert the intentions of governmental policies. The intercultural mediators, who help 
immigrants in the process of integration into Catalonian society, often have a “one-sided 
approach [which] might be deemed adequate within a framework of assimilation, but . . . does 
not fit with the immigration management [discourse] of local governments and non-state actors 
in Catalonia” (Agustí-Panareda 2006, 410). The disconnect between the government’s mission 
and the attempts to integrate appears through Agustí-Panaerda’s interviews of these mediators. 
The mediators often have misconceptions of their duties and take an active role in the integration 
of the immigrant. While the job of the mediator is to provide information and answer questions 
objectively, many see it as their duty to “[persuade]” and give “clear arguments” for certain 
issues of socialization (Agustí-Panareda 2006, 418). When the intercultural mediators lose 
objectivity, they fail the political mission of the Catalonian state to respect the validity of other 
cultures. This failure of intercultural mediators to remain objective undercuts the transition of 
immigrants, shifting the job of mediator to decision maker.  
When the immigrants’ decisions are taken away, the individuality of the immigrant is 
also taken. This leads to the treatment of immigrants like “students with physical or cognitive 
disabilities or with social deprivation of a different kind” (Pujolar 2010, 233). The main issue 
stems from local governments hiring mediators from independent programs (Agustí-Panareda 
2006). Although mediators are usually previously integrated immigrants (Agustí-Panareda 
2006), their use of personal experiences makes their advice subjective. The issue for these 
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mediators lies again within the use of assimilation instead of integration. Immigrants need to 
maintain aspects of their culture, and the process of integration should be a give-and-take. 
Therefore, the Catalonian government’s stance on immigrants is undercut by the misuse of social 
integration. 
Nonetheless, the advice of these mediators seems to guide the immigrant through 
rigorous social processes. Whether they assimilate or move toward intercultural integration, 
Catalonian society proves exceptionally complicated for the immigrants and their family. The 
complexity in part stems from the need to understand not only Catalonian culture but also 
Spanish culture. By exploring specific societal norms, the complex issue of social integration 
comes to light and helps explain why policy to aid immigrants and social treatment of 
immigrants differs so much.  
Societal Norms: 
 The issues immigrants face with adapting to Catalonian society stem from daily 
interactions. Two main problems surface in the quotidian life of immigrants: the choice of a 
social language, Spanish or Catalan, and the confrontation of negative sentiments toward 
immigrants and demonstrations of these sentiments. With Catalonia touting two distinct 
identities, both Spanish and Catalan, the issue of which language to learn becomes problematic 
for the immigrant. For Spanish migrants, the transition between the Spanish and Catalan 
languages is simple (Serra 2004). But, when an immigrant enters Catalonia, the decision of 
which language to learn first becomes crucial. Without a clear choice of which language to learn, 
immigrants will be unable “to build a sense of belonging and . . . meet their ordinary, 
communicative needs in everyday life” (Pujolar 2010, 229). The Catalonian regional government 
takes a clear stance on what language immigrants should learn, Catalan, by integrating it into 
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schools and community activities (Edwards 2016). For example in 2005, the regional 
government passed an Audiovisuals Act that requests audiovisual communication services use 
Catalan (Villaroya 2012). However, the expectation of immigrants to speak Catalan and the 
practice they get in the context of society are incongruent. During the 1970s and 1980s, many 
native Catalonians used “speech accommodation,” speaking to immigrants in Spanish, assuming 
the immigrant would know Spanish (Pujolar 2010, 230). The social courtesy of the Catalonian 
native to accommodate the immigrant with the assumption they know Spanish seems harmless. 
But, when the immigrant continues to only interact with other speakers in Spanish, rather than 
Catalan, it adds to the distance between the Catalonian community and the immigrant 
community. Joan Pujolar artfully points out that no one took the time to explain the 
“sociolinguistic situation” of Catalonia to the immigrant (2010, 236). Based on the Catalonian 
courtesy towards immigrants, immigrants will only come into contact with Catalan through the 
“mediation of Spanish” (Pujolar 2010, 237). This social phenomenon perpetuates the lag of 
immigrant integration despite the government’s attempts to educate the immigrant with Catalan.  
As in the school system, negativity surrounding immigrants flares up within the 
community. Gema Rubio-Carbonero and Ricard Zapata-Barrero conducted a study which 
monitored discriminatory conversations in the political sphere and found that political discourse 
in Catalonia is positive, but even small levels of discrimination pose massive threats to the 
integration of immigrants into society (2017). Namely, because immigrants do not feel welcome. 
One way in which discriminatory behavior affects the social integration of immigrants is the 
anti-mosque protests (Astor 2016). In many Catalonian counties, anti-mosque groups launch 
petitions against the construction of mosques in their area (Astor 2016). With high numbers of 
Islamic immigrants who desire to build traditional houses of worship, anti-mosque sentiments 
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prove detrimental to this sizable immigrant community. These actions craft a culture of 
exclusion, perceiving the immigrants’ deviation from social norms as a threat to the integrity of 
the regional identity (Astor 2016). Most anti-mosque sentiments originate in “neighborhoods 
with large numbers of internal migrants from other Spanish regions” (Astor 2016, 107). People 
still see immigrants as “[heightening] crime and insecurity, monopolizing plazas and other 
cherished public spaces, littering the streets with trash, living in over-occupied apartments, 
looking scandalously at women, and failing to integrate into the culture of the community” 
(Astor 2016, 113). Just as some discrimination stems from Spanish nationals, racism can also be 
found within Catalonian nationals.  
Catalonian racism is seen through negative political sentiment toward immigrants 
stemming from far right anti-separatist parties like Platform for Catalonia (PxC) (Rubio-
Carbonero and Zapata-Barrero 2017). Examples of negative dialogue toward immigrants coming 
from this group paint immigrants as a threat to the job security of the greater Catalonian state 
(Rubio-Carbonero and Zapata-Barrero 2017). This group, while holding no national or regional 
seats, jumped from 17 to 67 city councilor seats between 2007 and 2011, demonstrating that their 
presence in local elections continues to grow (Rubio-Carbonero and Zapata-Barrero 2017). The 
small yet growing number of PxC members proves to threaten the social stability of immigrant 
communities as PxC continually vilifies them. Negative discussion about immigrants, even if 
miniscule, causes social discomfort for the immigrant population. Although the general political 
conversation around immigration is both positive and productive, this small minority generates a 
substantial impact on the overall social well-being of the immigrant. In these ways, social 
niceties and large-scale racist ideological beliefs within Catalonia add barriers to social 
integration of immigrants.  
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The Possibilities an Independent Catalonia Provides for the Foreign Immigrant Community 
The educational system, social services, and societal norms evidence the disparity 
between the greater political goals of Catalonia and the ground-level social implementation of 
these policies. Often, the complexity of Catalonian society, being both Catalan and Spanish, 
builds social barriers that immigrants must hurdle to integrate and participate in Catalonia. So 
why would an independent Catalonia improve the integration of immigrants? An independent 
Catalonia eliminates the problems generated from a dual identity. In the sphere of education, 
schools would only teach in Catalan instead of both Spanish and Catalan. In the sphere of social 
services available to immigrants, a freed Catalonian state could hone the integration process to 
focus on the Catalonian identity. While social services can still improve across the board, the 
simplification of the process by a less complicated social situation will streamline immigrant 
integration. And finally, instead of dancing between languages, immigrants in a newly 
independent Catalonia would only be expected to speak Catalan. “Speech accommodation,” 
which reinforces immigrant exclusion by talking to immigrants first in Spanish, vanishes in the 
face of an independent Catalonia.  
Immigrants face discrimination on a daily basis. And while social prejudice will not 
vanish under an independent Catalonia, separatist groups see a niche group of support in 
immigrants as these political parties advocate for their concerns (Pratka 2017). Separatist groups 
call out to immigrants promising advocacy and citizenship under an independent Catalonia 
(Pratka 2017). Therefore, if Catalonia gains independence, the political party in charge will have 
immigrant needs in the forefront of their action plan. Freedom for Catalonia translates to one less 
social obstacle for immigrants to overcome. Catalonian independence begins to bridge the rift 
between immigrants and society at large by eliminating the second degree of social isolation. 
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Catalonia has claims to sovereignty through a thriving economy, unique language, and distinct 
history. However, Catalonia must continue to operate under the rule of the Spanish state. This 
creates additional hardships for immigrants integrating into Catalonian society. Therefore, an 
independent Catalonia will create a less socially complex place for immigrant integration. But 
just how feasible is independence? 
Catalonian Case for Independence 
 The Catalonian struggle for independence continues to surge in Catalonian society 
(Burchianti and Zapata 2014, Rodriguez 2018). In the 2017 elections for Catalonia’s parliament, 
candidates supporting Catalonian separation won seventy of the one hundred and thirty-five 
seats, gaining a slight majority within the chambers (Guárdia 2018). Tipping the scales in the 
separatists’ favor demonstrates the growing sentiment for Catalonian independence. The political 
demonstration of defiance against Spanish rule manifests deep-seated economic, cultural, and 
historical distinctions, pushing the Catalonian people to feel foreign and inherently different 
from the government which rules them. The issue of independence causes political polarization. 
The rhetoric behind autonomy attempts to strip away political bias. In an attempt to alleviate the 
political connotations of this argument, facts, figures, and hard data will compose the historical, 
economic, and cultural case for Catalonian independence. The case built for independence will 
illustrate how an independent Catalonia can be achieved, resulting in one step towards smoother 
integration of immigrants.  
 With independence gaining momentum, it is important to note the other option. If the 
solution to seamless social integration of immigrants is a less complex identity, why not embrace 
the Spanish identity and relinquish the Catalonian identity? In part, their case for independence 
answers this question. Should they abandon their culture, many people’s identity would be lost in 
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the process. Additionally, Spain has already granted the Catalonians many socio-cultural 
freedoms. In order to shift back to the Spanish identity, Spain would have to strip the Catalonian 
people of these freedoms. Amending their constitutional right to a unique linguistic identity 
would cause an uproar resulting in backlash towards the Spanish state. Therefore, the case for 
independence seems to be the more achievable simplification of the region’s social complexity.  
Unique Historical Arc 
 Spain’s history as a nation born out of regions remains integral to the current division 
between Catalonia and Spain. With a distinct regional past predating the unification of the 
Spanish state, Catalonia crafts a historical arc different from that of Spain. Catalonia’s separate 
history proves essential to the argument for independence and shows another facet of why 
Catalonians feel such strong differentiation between their culture and Spanish culture.  
The origins of Catalonia date back to 988 with the invasion of the Romans and Visigoths 
(Llobera 1998). In the Middle Ages, Catalonia established a political system with the 
combination of Federalism, Feudalism, and Pactism (Llobera 1998). In the 1400s, with the 
marriage of Ferdinand (Aragon) and Isabel (Castile), Spain became a semi-unified nation with 
extremely independent regions (Llobera 1998). In the seventeenth century, Catalonians engaged 
in their first battle to protect their “political, administrative, and judicial” freedoms. Even though 
Catalonia lost to Spain and relinquished some of its lands to France, this marked the first 
instance of a collective fight to protect its national identity (Vicente 2004, 120). In 1716, King 
Felipe V removed Catalan as the official language of the region through a degree called Nueva 
Planta. This loss of freedoms sent a clear message of initial Catalonian subjugation to the 
Spanish crown. However, the following centuries begin to establish Catalonia as a prominent 
region economically and a distinct region culturally.  
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Although stripped of some freedoms, Catalonia blossomed as an economic region in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, expanding with the Industrial Revolution (Vicente 2004). 
Without this period of prosperity, the Catalonian identity would have been jeopardized. After 
two centuries of economic success, Catalonia gained even more autonomy with the freedom of 
the Spanish colonies in 1913, as this loss represented the diminishing global powers of the 
Spanish monarchy (Vicente 2004). Catalonia’s brief independence, awarded under 
Mancomunitat (1914), vanished under the leadership of Primo de Rivera in 1923 (Vicente 2004). 
Catalonia again tasted political autonomy under the Second Republic in 1931-1939, but Franco 
crushed this freedom when he took power in 1939 (Vicente 2004). Franco repressed the 
Catalonian identity during his dictatorship, but this repression only fueled the Catalonian 
people’s already strong sentiments of their differences from the Spanish state (Vicente 2004). 
The oscillation of Catalonia from freedom to subjugation only added to the Catalonian dissent 
toward the Spanish government. Finally, at the end of Franco’s regime, the new Spanish 
government drafted a constitution in 1978 and Catalonia regained a measure of freedom 
(Villarroya 2012).  
This new constitution provides provisions for “historical nationalities” separate from the 
overarching Spanish nationality (Vicente 2004, 120). The recognition of nationalities solidifies 
Spain as a nation with a pluralistic identity and fuels ethnic rifts throughout the country. Spain 
legalized the divisions already felt within the states and armed these divisions with constitutional 
backing to determine their unique historical and cultural identity. Although the Spanish 
government gives rights to each nationality, many nationalities, including that of Catalonia, do 
not find these provisions to be sufficient. Therefore, Catalonia continually chips away at the 
Spanish identity and moves toward a stronger regional identity. Yet, the unified region of 
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Catalonia faces problems with multiculturalism. In the 1980s, even within the region, “the 
political map of Catalonia reflects the complexity” of this region’s approach towards separation, 
with multiple political parties, with only some leaning towards independence (Vicente 2004, 
122). Since Catalonia obtained regional autonomy, the movements that emphasize aspects of 
Catalonian culture all stem from language and economics, which manifest in political actions 
resulting in legislation.  
In Catalonia, the current conversation about separation and multiculturalism stand at 
odds. This opposition most distinctly appeared in the national elections of 2010-2011, where the 
notion of convivéncia, the advocacy for a peaceful pluralistic state, emerged as the leading 
subject of regional debate (Burchianti and Zapata 2014). These statements of unity color the 
post-Franco Catalonian conversation. The candidates used the idea of convivéncia to engage 
voters, especially those from non-Catalonian backgrounds, who want to find their new home 
within the Catalonian region. And since the 2010-2011 election, separatists’ movements only 
gained strength. The Catalonian nationalists passed three referendums demanding independence 
from the Spanish state. These referendums took place in 2013, 2015, and 2017 respectively, and 
each time the push for independence gained more momentum (Rodriguez 2018). But, separating 
from Spain is illegal according to the Spanish Constitution. Therefore, with the increased action 
of Catalonian separatists, Spain passed a military measure to seize Catalonian police and 
finances to avoid any violent moves towards separation (Rodriguez 2018). The seizure of these 
assets signals a new level of escalation in this dialogue. An independent Catalonia surfaces 
logically through the entirety of Catalonia’s history since their first clash with Spain and 





 Regarding both Spanish and European Union regions, the Catalonian economy thrives 
(Hoffmann 1999, Özkirimli 2000, MacInnes 2006). One major factor working to sustain the 
Catalonian economy is the vast middle class. In the 1900s, Catalonia provided an environment 
for an urban middle class that “was enterprising and liberal in outlook” (Hoffmann 1999, 52). 
These workers, who took on the role of “land-owning farmers, artisans, shopkeepers, workshop 
owners, and merchants,” invested in the economy of Catalonia, driving the grassroots movement 
towards Catalonian success that is evident today (Hoffmann 1999, 54). In this way, Catalonia’s 
healthy economic environment becomes attractive to immigrant populations who view the move 
to Catalonia as a strategic step to engage in upward social mobility (Hoffman 1999). The influx 
of people creates a perfect pool of lower to middle-class workers and allows the region to sustain 
their prosperity.  
To understand Catalonia’s continual quest for economic prominence, it is important to 
understand the economic hardships Catalonians faced under fascist rule. When the Franco 
regime was accused of corruption, Catalonia’s attitude became skeptical towards the central 
government’s management of money. This general distrust permeates into post-Franco Spain 
where Catalonia’s regional government, the Generalitat, protects the “regional industry elites, no 
doubt in reaction to . . . [Franco’s] maladministration and corruption” (Hoffmann 1999, 64). As 
the Catalonian economy continues to grow, the attitude of self-preservation crafted during 
Franco’s regime becomes a driving factor of the region’s economic success. These actions 
display Catalonia’s defense against the national government as necessary for Catalonia’s 
survival. The Catalonian separatists argue about the “fiscal unfair treatment by the state, which . . 
. [returns] an insufficient share of Catalan revenues” to Catalonia and is a crucial aspect of 
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Catalonia’s move towards independence (Serrano 2013, 534). The statistics of the Catalonian 
economy explain this sentiment of unjust taxation.  
Catalonia markets itself as “one of Europe’s most successful economic regions” 
(Hoffmann 1999, 65, Özkirimli 2000, MacInnes 2006). The current European Union economic 
profile of Catalonia states that “in 2016, Catalonia reached a gross domestic product (GDP) 
equivalent to 211,915m (euros), the highest registered by far, becoming the [leading] economy” 
in Spain (European Commission, 2018). Not only does Catalonia have the fourth highest GDP 
per capita in Spain (29,936, only behind Madrid, País Vasco, and Navarre), but they also rank 
fourth in “wealth of its citizens, above the Spanish and EU average” (National Institute of 
Statistics, 2018; European Commission, 2018). The unemployment rates in Catalonia in contrast 
with Spain also illustrates the relative wealth of their citizens, where only 12.2% of Catalonian 
citizens are unemployed in comparison to Spain’s 16.7% (Economic Country, 2018). Catalonia 
also welcomes industry contained within their borders, touting “20% of [all] companies located 
in Spain” (European Commission, 2018). This large amount of industry is equitable to 
Catalonia’s population. Catalonian houses 16.2% of the total Spanish population, only producing 
a little more than their population accounts for (European Commission, 2018). This fact shows 
their prosperity in relation to their region’s size. Figure 5 below shows the GDP (in euros) of 
Spain, Catalonia, and the Eurozone between 2004-2016. Catalonia surpassed even the Eurozone 
regarding GDP until 2008 when Spain went through a massive recession. And even then, 








Figure 5 (Statistica (2017) “Gross domestic product per capita in Catalonia, Spain and the 
Eurozone between 2004 and 2016” https://www.statista.com/statistics/327120/gdp-per-capita-in-
catalonia-spain-and-eurozone/)
 
Based on these statistics and the way the Spanish government structures taxes, Catalonians pay 
more in taxes than they receive back in governmental funding. From the Catalonian viewpoint, 
this means the Catalonians foot the bill to make up for less economically successful regions of 
Spain (Mount 2015). Considering these statistics, the Catalonians pay a high monetary value of 
taxes in contrast to other regions in Spain, comparable with other wealthy regions in the whole of 
Europe, but the returns are what differentiate Catalonia and bolster their argument (Mount 2015). 
With statistics demonstrating enormous economic success, Catalonia proves itself to be an 
excellent addition to the global market economy, should they gain independence. 
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As Catalonia’s economic status and relationships build within the worldwide community, 
Catalonia defines itself as an increasingly distinct region. The more deals they broker out of the 
region, the more other countries in the world entangle themselves in the Catalonian national 
argument for independence. Also, economic development and engagement in the global market 
economy lead to Catalonia taking on attributes of other European nations (Hoffmann 1999, 66). 
As Catalonia becomes like other prosperous nations in the EU, the more attractive they become 
as an independent nation to these countries. And the more their identity becomes integrated with 
European economic thought, the further away Catalonia moves from the Spanish nationality. In 
addition to these factors, Catalonia is an active participant in the European Union’s “Committee 
of the Regions” (Hoffmann 1999). This committee's primary purpose is to argue for regional 
issues in the EU as most legislative matters apply at this level. Catalonia leads the charge to 
make this committee the second chamber of the EU Parliament (Hoffmann 1999). With 
Catalonia at the forefront of the global and regional stage, its economic influence may drive 
other countries to accept its fight for independence.  
Distinct Language 
 Catalonia distinguishes itself from Spain not only as an economic powerhouse, but also 
as a culturally unique region. Catalonians speak their own language, participate in different 
holidays, and practice different traditions than the rest of the Spanish state. In this way, language, 
literacy, and historical memory become central aspects of the debate for Catalonian 
independence. The unique linguistic identity of the Catalonian region fosters a “historical 
memory” fundamental to the “contemporary Catalan identity” (Llobera 1998, 333, Cattini 2015). 
Historical memory is “the collective memory of a specific group” (Llobera 1998, 332, Cattini 
2015). Josep Llobera argues that historical memory is crucial to the national identity of stateless 
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nations such as Catalonia (Llobera 1998, 340, Cattini 2015, MacInnes 2006). This memory crafts 
a uniting thread through all Catalonian peoples. Language harbors this historical memory as 
Catalonia’s primary communicative method. Oral tradition passed through generations of 
Catalonian families weaves a collective narrative through their language.  
 Therefore, when Franco threatened their language, it was not simply a frustration to both 
learn and speak Spanish, but an attack on the historical memory of the Catalonian culture. In 
contemporary Spain, each “individual region [can] formulate [its] linguistic policies and [is] free 
to engage in measures aimed at recovering their languages” (Hoffmann 1999, 49, Villarroya 
2012). This new policy created under the Constitution of 1978 contrasts with Franco’s regime 
where “Catalonia’s language and culture were deprived of recognition and independence 
previously [enjoyed]” and often “stigmatized as a mere dialect with its speakers humiliated” 
(Hoffmann 1999, 53, Vicente 2004). In this period of oppression, the Catalonian people clung to 
the historical memory of their language and moving forward utilized this memory to recreate 
their culture. Spain’s linguistic difference became a fundamental issue after Franco’s death, 
where “it has become difficult to disentangle the linguistic and cultural from the parochial and 
political” (Hoffmann 1999, 50).  
To further complicate the pluralistic state of Spain, about “a quarter of all Spaniards 
speak a regional language in addition to the official language of the Spanish state, Castilian 
Spanish” (Hoffmann 1999, 51). The issue Spain faces today is the multitude of cultures and 
languages it harbors within its borders. Regions like Catalonia, which felt oppressed under 
Franco and find new freedom in the post-Franco society, charge head first into ensuring the 
recovery and sustainability of their languages. By allowing Catalonia to pursue the recovery of 
 
Bastie 27 
their language, Spain, perhaps inadvertently, pushed Catalonia along to discover and act upon 
their desire for independence.  
In the spirit of embracing their new linguistic freedom, Catalonia engaged in a language 
planning process “aimed at language recovery” and “linguistic normalization” (Hoffmann 1999, 
57-58). Catalonia implemented this new policy in two ways. First, citizens would use Catalan for 
all public activities. And second, the policy encourages the immigrant population to find a new 
sense of home in the region by learning the language (Hoffmann 1999). While some embraced 
this policy, many fought against it by citing their “constitutional rights to use [Spanish]” 
(Hoffmann 1999, 59). In the Spanish constitution, it states that Castilian Spanish is the national 
language with the toleration of other regional languages. This language planning policy proves 
effective despite Castilian Spanish remaining the official language of the country. Figure 6 
(below) shows speakers of Catalan by age in 2013. The figure has separate lines for both 
speaking and writing skills in either Spanish or Catalan. The figure demonstrates that Catalonian 
citizens have a working knowledge of the Spanish language. The implementation of the language 
planning policy took place roughly thirty years prior to 2013. People who were children during 
this policy, ranging in age from 15-40, see a sharp uptick in knowledge of the Catalonian 
language (Government of Catalonia 2013). Not only that, but those born well after the starting 
stages of the language planning policy demonstrate a knowledge equal to that of their knowledge 
of Spanish.  
 
Bastie 28 
Figure 6 (Government of Catalonia (2013) Language Use in the Population of Catalonia: Key 
results of the survey on Language Use in the Population) 
 
This apparent success of the language planning policy points to the post-Franco 
resistance to any form of linguistic repression and the Spanish acceptance of a pluralistic society 
(Hoffmann 1999, 62). Spain’s preservation of its unique cultural facets enables policies such as 
Catalonia’s language planning to flourish. Spain feels the repercussions of its pluralistic identity 
as the Catalonian people base their argument for independence in something that the Spanish 
government legalized and promotes. In this way, many Catalonian people draw boundaries based 
on language lines, pointing to theoretical borders at the change of language.  
The region implemented a set of new laws in 1998 (Law of Catalonian Language - 
Regional Law) attempting to reconcile the issues surfacing around immigrants who speak other 
languages. This law states the importance of the “bond between language and national identity, 
while at the same time [tries] to be as inclusive as possible of all those who live in Catalonia” 
(Hoffmann 1999, 68). Any region attempting to depart from their mother country would need to 
both maintain cultural cohesion and not ostracize a significant portion of their population. For 
Catalonia, this balancing act manifests in the Law of Catalonian Language (Regional), which 
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points to the historical memory in the use of their language and invites the newcomers to be a 
part of this narrative. In this way, the “language policy [strengthens] national identity, 
[contributing] to the nation-building process,” and attempts to “create a common bond between 
individuals stemming from very diverse backgrounds’” (Villarroya 2012, 38). The romantic 
sentiment here shows why language is a successful argument for independence. Language 
represents a tangible difference from Spain and a growing unifying factor among Catalonian 
citizens.  
Conclusions 
 Catalonian independence is not just possible, but it is at the forefront of the current 
political conversation. In 2018, Catalonian separatist leaders who were incarcerated in Germany 
were set free to return to Catalonia. The question becomes what is the next step for Catalonia, 
and what does this next step look like for immigrants? The current Spanish government, under 
the rule of the Popular Party, strongly opposes independence and even working with the 
Catalonian government. This disinterest in compromise was evidenced in 2012 when the 
Catalonian right wing separatist group, Convergence, attempted to make an economic deal with 
the central government, of which they backed out. Spain’s other political parties, such as the 
rising Podemos party, seem to be interested in reconsidering the Spanish constitution to 
accommodate regions like Catalonia (Delclós 2017). Should Catalonia break away from Spain, 
the Spanish state could dissolve as the Basque Country and Galicia also have strong pushes for 
independence. So, the Catalonian push for independence could have national consequences for 
the whole Spanish state. With their independence gaining momentum, the scales could tip either 




Throughout this paper, I analyzed the immigrant population, making the case that if 
Catalonia gained independence, immigrants would integrate into society quicker and with less 
difficulty. This ease of integration stems mainly from language learning and sociocultural 
adaptation which will be simplified with a singular identity. With independence up in the air 
currently, the immigrants’ condition should be considered. Even if Catalonia does not gain 
independence, the integration process for the historic nationalities within the Spanish state needs 
to be reassessed. While the ease of integration does not bolster the argument for independence, it 
does demonstrate one positive impact independence would have on a newly formed Catalonian 
state. Catalonian independence would help to resolve the disconnect between policy and 
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